Keywords: European Union, economic policy, political decisions, political accountability, institutional analysis, democratic crisis, bureaucracy

Introduction: From Peace Project to Regulatory Machine
The European Union was born from the ashes of World War II as a revolutionary project for peace, economic cooperation, and shared prosperity. Its foundations were meant to be common sense, the principle of subsidiarity, and the belief that decisions should be made as close to the citizen as possible. For decades, this model worked, bringing Europe its longest period of peace in history, a common market, and growing prosperity.

In recent years, however, we have witnessed a process of deep transformation, or perhaps even degeneration, of this project. Instead of a „multi-speed Europe” or a „Europe of fatherlands,” we are dealing with increasingly aggressive centralization of power in Brussels, the production of excessive regulations, and decisions detached from the economic, social, and cultural realities of member states. The project that was meant to unite increasingly divides; the one meant to strengthen competitiveness weakens it; the one meant to build democratic legitimacy loses citizens’ trust.

This article is not an attack on the very idea of European integration, which in its original form remains valuable. It is a critical analysis of specific decisions and policy directions that – from the perspective of an economist, journalist, and ordinary citizen – can be considered exceptionally ill-conceived, costly, or downright harmful. This analysis is not based on emotions, but on economic data, observation of social consequences, and assessment of decision-making processes.

The questions we pose are fundamental to any democratic community: What were the real consequences of these decisions? What went wrong in the process of making them? Why has no one been held meaningfully accountable for these mistakes? And will anyone be held accountable before the EU loses its ability to correct its course?

1. The Green Deal in Its Current Form: Ideology Before Reality
The European Green Deal, announced in 2019, was meant to be the EU’s flagship project, a „new growth strategy” combining climate protection with economic development. In theory, it was to transform the EU into the „first climate-neutral continent.” In practice, it has become an example of ideological policy, imposed without adequate analysis of costs, social, and geopolitical impacts.

Consequences: A Balance of Costs and Losses

• Sharp Increase in Energy Costs – The „Fit for 55” package (55% emissions reduction by 2030) significantly raised energy costs for industry and households. According to analyses by the Bruegel think tank, climate policy accounted for about 20-30% of the rise in energy prices in the EU before the 2022 energy crisis.
• Decline in European Industrial Competitiveness – Energy-intensive sectors (steel, chemicals, ceramics) began relocating production en masse outside the EU, mainly to the USA (where energy is cheaper thanks to shale) and Asia. Carbon leakage became a fact, rather than a theoretical threat.
• Accelerated Deindustrialization – Germany, the engine of the European economy, recorded its largest drop in industrial production in 30 years in 2023. While the US invests in its industry through the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the EU imposes additional costs on it.
• Inflationary Pressure Hitting the Poorest – The costs of the transition are regressive: the poorest households spend a larger share of their income on energy and food, whose prices have been driven up by climate policy.

What Went Wrong: Flawed Assumptions

• Ignoring Time and Physics – The energy transition requires decades and stable baseload sources. The EU bet on unstable renewables while phasing out stable nuclear and gas energy before adequate storage infrastructure was built.
• Subsidies Instead of Innovation – Instead of investing in research into breakthrough technologies (like nuclear fusion, advanced geothermal), the EU focused on subsidizing existing, immature technologies (like photovoltaics and wind turbines), while importing them from China.
• Lack of Geopolitical Analysis – The EU made itself dependent on China in the supply chains for green technologies (rare earth metals, panels, turbines). Exchanging dependence on Russian gas for dependence on Chinese technology is not strategic progress.

Accountability: Diffused and Ineffective
Decisions were collective, diffused between the European Commission (especially Vice-Presidents Frans Timmermans and Margrethe Vestager), the European Council (heads of state), and the European Parliament. Political accountability for erroneous assumptions is impossible to enforce because there is no mechanism allowing citizens to hold specific individuals in Brussels accountable. The Green Deal became a „sacred cow,” where criticism is treated as an attack on the very idea of climate protection.

2. Emissions Trading System (ETS): Market or Speculation Machine?
The EU Emissions Trading System was meant to be a flagship, market-based mechanism for limiting CO₂ emissions. The principle was simple: limit the pool of available allowances so their price would incentivize investment in low-carbon technology. In practice, it became one of the most distorted financial markets, where speculation dominates over achieving environmental goals.

Consequences: Who Profits?

• Drastic Increase in Electricity and Heating Prices – The cost of emission allowances (from around €5-10/ton in 2013-2017 to over €100/ton in 2023) is directly passed on to consumer bills. It’s a tax mechanism in market disguise.
• Huge Money Transfers to Financial Funds – It is estimated that since 2008, financial institutions have earned tens of billions of euros trading emission allowances, without reducing emissions by a single gram. The market became attractive to speculators due to artificial scarcity and volatility.
• Paradoxical Bonuses for the Biggest Polluters – In the initial phase of the ETS, the largest power plants and steel mills received the most free allowances, which they could then resell, making billion-euro profits at society’s expense (so-called windfall profits).

What Went Wrong: Distortion of the Idea

• Price Detached from Abatement Cost – The allowance price does not reflect the actual cost of reducing a ton of emissions in a given sector, but rather market sentiment, speculation, and political interventions (like the Commission’s decision to withdraw allowances from the market).
• No Safeguards Against Extremes – The system lacks built-in mechanisms (e.g., a price cap) to protect the economy from price spikes during periods of energy shortage or speculation.
• Punishment for Europe, Profit for Others – While European industry pays for emissions, competitors from the US, China, or India do not bear similar costs, giving them a competitive advantage.

Accountability: Anonymous System Architects
The designers of the ETS from the Directorate-General for Climate Action and the European Parliament remain anonymous to the public. The lack of personal accountability for the system’s evident flaws (which were criticized already at the design stage) means no one feels obliged to undertake a thorough reform. Instead, the system is only being expanded to new sectors (like transport and buildings), threatening further price increases for citizens.

3. Ban on Sales of Combustion Engine Cars from 2035: Technological Dictatorship
The 2022 decision by the European Parliament and Council to ban the registration of new cars with combustion engines from 2035 is an emblematic example of technocratic arrogance. It is not the market and innovation, but a political decision that is to determine the future of the most important branch of European industry.

Consequences: Industrial Suicide

• Weakening of the European Automotive Sector – Europe is the cradle of the automotive industry. Mandating a switch to one specific technology (electric) within a strictly defined timeframe robs companies of time for a natural transformation and experimentation with alternatives.
• Dependence on China for Batteries and Raw Materials – China currently controls about 80% of the global lithium-ion battery supply chain. Europe, pursuing electrification, has become a strategic client of Beijing, while having minimal production capacity itself.
• Increase in Car Prices and Transport Exclusion – The average price of an electric car is still significantly higher than a combustion one. For the middle and lower classes, personal cars may become unaffordable, deepening mobility inequalities.
• Unresolved Infrastructure and Raw Material Problems – The decision was made without guarantees that by 2035 a sufficient charging network would be built, and that raw materials (lithium, cobalt, nickel) would be available in the required quantities without environmental destruction and human rights abuses.

What Went Wrong: Dogmatism Instead of Pragmatism

• Rejection of Technological Neutrality – Instead of setting a goal (zero-emission) and letting the market find the best pathways (electric, hydrogen, e-fuels, advanced hybrids), the EU chose one option, favoring non-European technology suppliers.
• Ignoring the Energy Mix – An electric car is only as clean as the energy used to charge it. In countries where coal dominates the energy mix (like Poland or Germany during windless periods), transport electrification brings minimal climate benefits at enormous cost.
• Contempt for Consumer Choice – The decision strips citizens of the right to choose the technology that best suits their needs (range, price, usage pattern).

Accountability: The Greens and Commissioners Without Vision
Political responsibility lies primarily with the Green and Social Democrat factions in the European Parliament, which pushed for this ban, and Climate Commissioner Frans Timmermans. The decision was made under pressure from climate activists and without a substantive debate on alternatives. When Germany unexpectedly demanded an exception for e-fuels in 2023, it became clear the whole process was more of a political bargain than a considered industrial strategy.

4. Migration Policy Without Control: Openness Without Integration
Since the 2015 migration crisis, EU migration policy has drifted between chaos and ideology. The „openness” promoted by part of the elites was not backed by effective mechanisms for controlling external borders, integration, or distinguishing between war refugees and economic migrants.

Consequences: Social Divisions and the Fiction of Solidarity

• Deep Social Tensions and Rise of Populism – The mass, uncontrolled migration of 2015-2016 became fuel for populist and nationalist parties across the EU, destabilizing the political scenes of many countries (Italy, Sweden, Germany, Austria).
• Increase in Social Costs and System Burden – Destination countries (Germany, Sweden, France) incurred billions in costs related to providing shelter, healthcare, education, and social benefits for hundreds of thousands of newcomers, often without adequate funds from the EU budget.
• Decline in Sense of Security and Rise in Crime – While most migrants do not commit crimes, statistics in some countries (especially Sweden) indicate a disproportionate increase in crime among young migrants, undermining trust in the state and integration policy.
• Humanitarian Crisis at Borders and Smuggler Exploitation – The lack of legal migration pathways and an asylum system deterring abuse has led to thriving human smuggling and humanitarian tragedies at borders (e.g., between Belarus and Poland).

What Went Wrong: Utopian Assumptions and Hypocrisy

• Ignoring Cultural Differences and Absorption Capacities – Policy based on the idea of „multiculturalism” did not account for the scale of cultural differences and the limited capacity of European societies to assimilate large, culturally homogeneous groups in a short time.
• Lack of Real Solidarity – The quota relocation mechanism proved a failure. Central and Eastern European countries refused to accept migrants, and Western countries were not willing to actually fund the protection of external borders (e.g., by Greece, Italy, or Spain).
• Turning Migration into a Moral, Not Political, Issue – Public debate was dominated by emotions and accusations of „lacking humanity,” preventing a rational discussion about limits, criteria, and conditions for accepting migrants.

Accountability: Merkel and the Commission Under Pressure
Symbolic responsibility for the 2015 crisis lies with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her famous „Wir schaffen das” („We can do this”), which became a signal encouraging migrants. At the EU level, responsibility lies with the Juncker Commission and Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, who failed to propose a coherent, feasible plan. But as usual in the EU, no one lost their position or faced political consequences for this multidimensional crisis.

5. The Common Agricultural Policy in Its New Guise: Bureaucracy Instead of Production
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), once the foundation of prosperity and food self-sufficiency in the EU, has in recent years been transformed into a tool for implementing Green Deal objectives. Farmers have become not food producers, but executors of absurdly complicated forms and providers of „ecosystem services.”

Consequences: Crisis in Agriculture and Rising Prices

• Decline in Profitability and Loss of Small Farms – Imposing stringent environmental norms (e.g., limiting fertilizers and pesticides, setting aside 4% of land) without compensation in the form of higher purchase prices makes smaller farms unprofitable. Thousands of farmers across the EU are protesting.
• Increase in Food Prices and Import Dependency – Limiting production in the EU amid constant demand leads to higher prices and increased imports from countries with lower environmental standards (e.g., Ukraine, Brazil), a classic example of „carbon leakage” in agriculture.
• Bureaucratization of the Farming Profession – It is estimated that farmers spend up to a third of their time filling out applications and documentation instead of working the land. Controls are burdensome, and penalties for paperwork errors are severe.
• Threat to Food Security – In the face of war in Ukraine (Europe’s breadbasket), it turned out that the drive to reduce cultivated and farmed land in the name of environmental goals can be geostrategically risky.

What Went Wrong: City Designers in the Countryside

• Policy Designed by Officials Detached from Rural Reality – Decision-makers in Brussels (often from big cities) treat agriculture as a source of environmental problems, not as a strategic sector for food supply.
• One-Size-Fits-All Template for Diverse Regions – The same requirements apply to large-scale farms in Hungary and small family farms in mountainous Austria, which is unfair and inefficient.
• The Green Deal as an Overarching Goal – Environmental goals (biodiversity, reducing agricultural emissions) were placed above the primary objective: efficient production of healthy and affordable food for Europeans.

Accountability: The Agriculture Commission and the Greens
Direct responsibility lies with the European Commission, especially Agriculture Commissioner Janusz Wojciechowski, who agreed to incorporate environmental „schemes” into the CAP, turning it into climate policy. The European Parliament, where the Green faction has significant influence on the shape of environmental policies, also contributed to this direction. Farmer protests in 2023 and 2024 forced the Commission to make some concessions (e.g., temporarily suspending the set-aside requirement), showing that street pressure is more effective than rational arguments.

6. Overregulation of the Digital Market: DMA and DSA – Barriers to Innovation
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act (DSA), adopted in 2022, were meant to be a response to the dominance of big tech giants (so-called gatekeepers) and threats related to illegal content online. In theory, they were to protect consumers and smaller players. In practice, they became further examples of the European tendency towards excessive, premature regulation, which stifles competition instead of stimulating it.

Consequences: Europe as a Technological Museum

• Slowed Innovation and Flight of Startups – The cost burden of compliance with the new rules (especially for medium-sized firms aspiring to grow) is so great that many promising companies prefer to move their headquarters outside the EU (e.g., to Switzerland, the UK, or USA) even before reaching the „gatekeeper” threshold.
• Increased Barriers to Entry and Cementing Giants’ Positions – Paradoxically, complex and costly regulations are easiest for the wealthiest firms (Google, Meta, Amazon) to bear, as they have armies of lawyers and compliance officers. For small competitors, they often form an insurmountable barrier.
• Deterioration of Services for Consumers – Some DMA provisions (like the ban on combining data from different services) may lead to a decline in the quality of personalized services (e.g., recommendations, security) without clear benefits for consumers.
• Europe as Global Regulator, Not Innovator – The EU specializes in creating regulations (GDPR, DMA, DSA), while the USA and Asia specialize in creating breakthrough technologies (AI, biotech, fintech). This is a defensive strategy that does not guarantee future prosperity.

What Went Wrong: Regulating the Future Based on the Past

• Regulating Phenomena That Are Not Understood – The acts were written by lawyers and politicians who often lack a deep understanding of the technology they try to regulate. The result is imprecise definitions (e.g., „large platforms”) and the risk of unintended consequences.
• Focus on Punishing Leaders, Not Building Alternatives – Instead of investing in European tech champions (e.g., through R&D tax breaks, venture capital), the EU focuses on punishing American and Chinese giants.
• Risk of Internet Fragmentation – Different regulatory regimes in different jurisdictions may lead to „internet silos,” where global services must be adapted locally, increasing costs and limiting synergy.

Accountability: Vestager and the Dominance of Lawyers
The main architect of these regulations is European Commission Vice-President Margrethe Vestager, who has for years led a crusade against American tech giants. Her approach – focused on competition law and consumer protection – has dominated thinking about the digital economy in the EU. However, the lack of clear successes (have European digital firms gained from her policies?) has not affected her position. Responsibility also lies with the European Parliament, which passed these acts without deeper reflection on their long-term impact on the continent’s innovativeness.

7. The Euro as a Currency for All: A Construction Without Foundations
The introduction of the euro in 1999 (cash from 2002) was the boldest step in integration. However, the project of a monetary union without fiscal, banking, and political union turned out to be a flawed construction, painfully revealed by the crises: financial 2008-2009, sovereign debt in the eurozone 2010-2015, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Consequences: Constant Tensions and Transfers Without Reforms

• Debt Crises and Bailout Programs – Southern countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) lost the ability to devalue their own currency as an adjustment tool during recessions. This led to deep crises, requiring painful reforms (austerity) and billion-euro bailout packages from northern countries (mainly Germany).
• Persistent Competitiveness Gaps and Trade Imbalances – Germany, thanks to low labor costs and high productivity, accumulated a huge trade surplus. Southern countries have chronic deficits. The euro entrenched these differences instead of narrowing them.
• Political Tensions Between North and South – Citizens of „frugal” countries (Germany, Netherlands, Finland) feel they are paying for the irresponsibility of others. Citizens of „indebted” countries feel like victims of diktats from Brussels and Berlin. This undermines European solidarity.
• The Central Bank as the Only Glue – The European Central Bank (ECB) has de facto become the main guardian of eurozone stability, taking controversial actions (like buying sovereign bonds under the OMT and QE programs) that enter the realm of fiscal policy, for which it lacks a political mandate.

What Went Wrong: Politics Before Economics

• Convergence Criteria as Fiction – Countries adopted the euro by meeting the Maastricht criteria (debt, deficit), often through creative accounting (Greece is a glaring example). There was a lack of real economic convergence.
• Lack of Correction Mechanisms – In a monetary union, asymmetric shocks (affecting some countries more than others) require either labor mobility, fiscal transfers, or wage flexibility. In the EU, these mechanisms are underdeveloped.
• The „More or Less Europe” Dilemma – For the euro to function stably, deeper fiscal integration (common budget, eurobonds) is needed. But northern countries do not agree to this, fearing transfers. The impasse is permanent.

Accountability: Kohl, Mitterrand, and Blind Faith in Integration
Historical responsibility lies with the founding fathers of the euro, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand, who treated the euro primarily as a political project (binding Germany to Europe after reunification). Economists (like the late Milton Friedman) warned about the prematurity of this union, but these voices were ignored. Today, responsibility for maintaining this fragile construction lies with the ECB and the leaders of eurozone countries, who cannot break the impasse between federalization and disintegration.

8. Centralization of Power in Brussels: The Death of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the treaties, states that the EU takes action only when objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national, regional, or local level. In the last two decades, this principle has been systematically violated. Brussels gradually takes over competences in areas that should remain within the purview of member states.

Consequences: Democratic Deficit and Alienation

• Alienation of Citizens and Rise of Euroscepticism – When decisions are made in distant Brussels and citizens see no direct influence on the process, they lose trust in EU institutions. Referendums in the Netherlands, France, or Ireland (rejecting treaties or agreements) are often a rebellion against this distance.
• Uniformization of Life in a Diverse Europe – Attempts to impose the same standards in such diverse areas as the judicial system, social policy, or education lead to erasing the continent’s rich diversity and provoke resistance.
• Decline in Trust in National Institutions – National governments often use Brussels as a „scapegoat,” shifting responsibility for unpopular decisions onto it („Brussels made us”). This weakens national political systems.
• Overgrown Bureaucracy and Lobbying – Centralization attracts thousands of lobbyists to Brussels trying to influence legislation. A closed ecosystem of officials, politicians, and interest groups emerges, detached from the real problems of ordinary people.

What Went Wrong: The Imperative of „More Europe”

• Treating Integration as an End in Itself – For many eurocrats and federalists, any transfer of competence to the EU level is progress, regardless of practical outcomes. This is ideological thinking.
• Exploiting Crises to Shift Competences – The financial, migration, pandemic, and energy crises were each used as a pretext to increase the powers of EU institutions (e.g., via the NextGenerationEU recovery fund, which gave the Commission the right to borrow).
• Weakness of Subsidiarity Control Mechanisms – The Protocol on subsidiarity and proportionality is ineffective. National parliaments can issue a „yellow card,” but the Commission rarely takes it seriously.

Accountability: The European Commission and the Court of Justice
The main driver of centralization is the European Commission, whose officials have a natural tendency to expand their competences. The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) also plays a key role, often interpreting law in favor of broader EU competences (the principle of „effectiveness” – effet utile). Responsibility also lies with national governments, which agree to transfer competences in exchange for short-term political or financial benefits.

9. Economic Sanctions Without Impact Analysis: Shooting Oneself in the Foot
The EU has become increasingly inclined in the last decade to use economic coercion (sanctions) as a tool of foreign policy. While sanctions against the Lukashenko regime or for the annexation of Crimea were relatively effective, the massive sanctions package against Russia after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine revealed serious flaws in their design process and a lack of analysis of impacts on the EU itself.

Consequences: Symmetric Blow

• Sharp Rise in Energy Prices and Hyperinflation – The embargo on Russian coal, oil, and gas (and the price cap mechanism) led to a price shock in Europe. Inflation in the eurozone reached 10%, and gas prices increased tenfold, hitting industry and households.
• Loss of Export Markets and Deindustrialization – Russia was an important export market for European goods (from luxury cars to machinery). Sanctions closed this market, while Russia found new suppliers (China, India) and developed its own import substitution production.
• Strengthening of Competitive Economies – The US, benefiting from cheap energy and the IRA program, attracted European industrial investments. China and India, buying cheap Russian oil, gained a competitive advantage.
• Funding the War via Intermediaries – Sanctions proved leaky. Russia, through third countries (Kazakhstan, Turkey, UAE), still procures Western technology and components, and its economy, though modified, has not collapsed.

What Went Wrong: Politics of Symbols Over Interest

• Sanctions as a Substitute for Policy – Instead of a realistic security and diplomacy strategy, the EU (under pressure from the US and public opinion) reached for the sharpest economic tool, without a Plan B in case they failed.
• Ignoring Dependencies and Delayed Diversification – For years, Germany and other countries built dependence on Russian raw materials. Sanctions were imposed without first securing alternative supplies, a classic strategic error.
• Asymmetry of Costs – The costs of sanctions are unevenly distributed: Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic bear greater costs than France or Spain. There are no mechanisms for solidary compensation of these differences.
• Lack of Clear Goal and Exit Strategy – Is the goal regime change in Russia, withdrawal from Ukraine, or paying reparations? Without a clear goal and success criteria, sanctions become a permanent, costly state, not a tool.

Accountability: Borrell and the Council Under Emotional Pressure
The main architect of EU sanctions policy is the High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, and the European Council (heads of state). Decisions were made under enormous emotional and media pressure following Russian war crimes. Rational analysis of long-term economic consequences was pushed aside by the political-moral imperative of „doing something.” When the consequences hit Europeans, there was no turning back without giving Putin a sense of victory.

10. Lack of Real Political Accountability: The Systemic Defect of Democracy
The last and most important point is not a single decision, but a systemic defect of the EU construction: the chronic lack of real, personal political accountability for mistakes, failures, and wasting public money.

Consequences: Cycle of Errors and Cynicism

• Repeating the Same Mistakes – If no one is held accountable for the failure of 2015 migration policy, why should its assumptions change? If no one is accountable for the costs of the ETS, why should it be reformed? Lack of accountability blocks learning from mistakes.
• Cynicism of Elites and Rise of Populism – Citizens see the same commissioners, officials, and MEPs who made bad decisions remain in their posts or move to even better ones. This breeds the belief that the EU is a club for the initiated, playing a game separate from the interests of ordinary people.
• Waste of Public Funds – The European Court of Auditors annually points out irregularities in EU budget spending (recently about 4% of the budget). This rarely leads to personal consequences. Projects like the „tower of nothing” (an unused control tower in Poland) or abuses in farm funds are treated as a cost of doing business.
• Weakening of Democratic Legitimacy – In nation-states, citizens can „throw out” a government in elections. In the EU, this mechanism is extremely weak. The European Commission is appointed, and European Parliament elections are treated as secondary to national ones.

What Went Wrong: Democratic Deficit Written in the Genes

• Diffuse Legitimacy of the European Commission – The Commission has a technocratic-political character. Its president is chosen by leaders of states, not in direct elections. Commissioners are delegated by governments. There is no direct mechanism of accountability to the European demos.
• Weakness of the European Parliament – Although the EP gained powers, elections to it are still secondary. Turnout is lower, and campaigns focus mainly on national issues. The EP has no legislative initiative and rarely rejects key Commission proposals.
• Collective Nature of Council Decisions – The European Council and the Council of the EU make decisions collectively. This allows national leaders to shift responsibility onto the „collective” and avoid consequences at home for unpopular decisions made in Brussels.
• Immunities and Privileges of the Eurocrat Caste – High salaries, immunities, and a pension system separate from national systems create an impression of a privileged caste living in a different world from citizens.

Accountability: All of Us Who Accept This System
Ultimately, responsibility for the lack of accountability lies with member states, which do not want to surrender enough sovereignty to create a true federation with a democratically elected European government, nor do they want to restore sovereignty to nations, leaving the EU as a hybrid, undemocratic moloch. Responsibility also lies with EU citizens, who are not interested in EP elections and do not demand institutional reforms. Finally, responsibility lies with the media, which report on Brussels as a distant, boring topic instead of tracking and revealing the mechanisms of power.

Why Has No One Been Punished? Anatomy of a System Without Accountability
The mechanism for avoiding accountability in the EU is multi-layered:

1. Diffusion of Decisions – Every decision is a resultant of a compromise between the Commission, Council, and Parliament. Whom to blame? „The Union” – an abstract entity.
2. Technocratic Justifications – Political mistakes are masked as „technical necessity,” „expert recommendations,” or „requirements to meet treaty objectives.” This strips decisions of their political dimension, for which one could be held accountable.
3. Rotation of Positions – Commissioners and high officials serve one term (5 years), then move to the private sector (lobbying, corporations) or return to national politics. Before the consequences of their decisions become obvious, they are long gone.
4. Lack of Independent Investigative Bodies – The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has limited competences. Investigative journalists have limited access to documents. Whistleblower culture is weak.

Will Anyone Face Consequences? Future Scenarios
If the current direction continues, the consequences will be borne not by decision-makers, but by citizens: in the form of a lower standard of living, fewer jobs, limited prospects for the young, and growing social tensions and tensions between member states. Possible scenarios:

• Marginalization Scenario – The EU becomes an increasingly less significant economic and political player on the world stage, drifting towards a museum of regulation and declining competitiveness.
• Disintegration Scenario – The rise of Eurosceptic sentiment could lead to another Brexit (perhaps from France or Italy under far-right rule) or the de facto collapse of the eurozone.
• Forced Federalization Scenario – A crisis (e.g., another financial one) could be used to push through deeper fiscal and political integration, but without democratic legitimacy, provoking an even greater rebellion.
• Reform Scenario (Most Optimistic) – Electoral pressure (success of parties critical of the status quo in the 2024 EP elections and later) will force the establishment to undertake real reforms: a return to subsidiarity, a focus on competitiveness, simplification of regulations, and the introduction of political accountability mechanisms.

The only real form of accountability today is electoral pressure. Elections to the European Parliament, as well as national elections (where European issues are increasingly important), give citizens a chance to change direction. This, however, requires citizens to break their apathy and treat the EU as a community for which they are responsible, not as an external force that „happens to us.”

Conclusion: Criticism Out of Love, Not Hatred
Criticism of the European Union, especially as sharp as this, is often read as a manifestation of anti-Europeanism, Russophilia, or short-sighted populism. This is a mistake. The real sign of indifference towards Europe is the silent acceptance of its mistakes and its drift towards a course that could lead to its downfall.

The European project is too valuable to let it be wasted by the arrogance of elites, ideological zealotry, and a systemic lack of accountability. The original idea of Europe as cooperation, trade, free movement of people and ideas – a Europe of fatherlands cooperating with each other – is still relevant and attractive.

However, we need the courage to admit mistakes. We need institutional reforms that restore the link between the decision-maker and the citizen. We need a return to realism in economic and foreign policy. Without this, even the best idea – the idea of a united, peaceful, and prosperous Europe – can turn into a costly, detached-from-reality experiment that ends in disappointment for those who believed in it most: its citizens.

This article is the author’s opinion and analysis. We encourage discussion and confrontation with the theses presented here.